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Comments 
 
Disgorgement of Defendant’s Gains 
from “Opportunistic” Breach of 
Contract:   Its Fit in  Rhode Island 
 
Kelsey A. Hayward* 
 
For breach of contract, should the plaintiff/non-breaching 
party be able to get a remedy based on any profit the defendant 
made from the breach? Contract law generally answers “no”: The 
norm is that the non-breaching party who seeks a monetary 
remedy is entitled to “compensation” for its losses resulting from 
the breach rather than “disgorgement” or “restitution” of the 
defendant’s gains resulting from the breach.1 But consider the 
following scenario from the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and 
Unjust Enrichment (2011): 
Farmer sells Buyer his entire crop of carrots for the 
coming season at a price of $500 per ton. It is in Buyer’s 
interest to be the exclusive distributor of Farmer’s  
carrots, and Farmer’s obligation to tender his entire 
output is a material term of the parties’ agreement. Bad 
weather results in a reduced harvest and higher prices. 
Farmer delivers 20 tons of carrots to Buyer, then sells a 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of  Law,  
2018. Thank you to Professor Colleen Murphy, Clare Harmon, and Gregory 
Henninger for all of your guidance and support throughout the writing 
process. 
1. Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 253 (R.I. 1996). 
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further 10 tons to a competing buyer at $800 per ton.2 
The Restatement (Third) indicates that the Buyer need not be 
relegated to compensation based on its loss resulting from the 
breach.3 Instead, the Buyer may obtain disgorgement of Farmer’s 
gain resulting from the breach—$3000 (10 tons sold to a different 
purchaser for $300 per ton more than the contract price between 
Farmer and Buyer).4 This disgorgement remedy is advantageous 
when defendant’s gain is greater than plaintiff’s loss, or when the 
plaintiff more easily can prove defendant’s gain than the plaintiff’s 
own loss. The disgorgement remedy on these facts is justified 
because the Farmer intentionally breached the contract and a 
compensatory remedy based on Buyer’s loss resulting from the 
breach might insufficiently protect the very thing that Buyer 
bargained for in the contract—the right to be the exclusive 
distributor of Farmer’s carrots.5 
Beyond   this   illustration,   Restatement (Third)  Section 39 
broadly recognizes a remedy for disgorgement of a defendant’s 
gains in a limited category of breach of contract actions.6 Under 
Restatement (Third) Section 39, the disgorgement remedy is 
available when: (1) the breach is deliberate, (2) the breach is 
profitable, and (3) the claimant’s contractual entitlement cannot 
adequately be protected by an award for compensatory damages.7 
When these three conditions are met, the breach is “opportunistic” 
and can be remedied by restitution—disgorgement of the 
defendant’s gains—rather than compensation.8 The critical policy 
argument supporting the disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” 
breaches is that one who intentionally breaches a contract should 
not be allowed to keep its gains if a compensatory remedy would 
inadequately protect the plaintiff’s bargained-for entitlement 
under the contract.9  The disgorgement remedy does not punish 
 
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. h, illus. 14 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. See id. 
6. Id. § 39. 
7. Id. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. § 39 cmt. b (“A promisor who was permitted to exploit the 
shortcomings of the promisee’s damage remedy could accept the price of the 
promised performance, then deliver something less than what was promised. 
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the defendant, but instead, “merely deprives a defendant of  a 
profit wrongfully made.”10 
In this Comment, I argue that, based on the trend toward 
disgorgement in other jurisdictions, and Rhode Island’s past 
recognition of a remedy based on defendant’s gains in breach of 
contract for the sale of land and in contexts other than breach of 
contract, Rhode Island should recognize the disgorgement remedy 
as an alternative to compensatory damages in “opportunistic” 
breaches of contract.  Part I of this Comment will address the  
state of the law in other jurisdictions, demonstrating that both 
before and after the adoption of Restatement (Third) Section 39, 
disgorgement has been a widely accepted alternative to a typical 
compensatory damages remedy. Part II shows that Rhode Island 
case law already recognizes a disgorgement remedy for a breach of 
contract for the sale of land and in the non-contractual settings of 
unfair competition and breach of fiduciary duty. Part III argues 
that based on the trend of other jurisdictions and the logical 
implications of the Rhode Island disgorgement  cases,  Rhode 
Island courts should allow a claimant to recover disgorgement of 
defendant’s gains in “opportunistic” breaches of contract—as 
described in Restatement (Third) Section 39—because a 
disgorgement remedy protects a plaintiff’s contractual entitlement 
and deprives an intentionally breaching party of wrongful gains. 
I. MODERN TREND TOWARD DISGORGEMENT OF DEFENDANT’S GAINS 
IN CERTAIN TYPES OF BREACH OF CONTRACT CASES 
Courts have increasingly allowed plaintiffs to recover 
defendant’s gains in a claim for restitution when there has been  
an “opportunistic” breach of contract.11 Even before the inclusion 
of Section 39 in the Restatement (Third), several jurisdictions 
awarded disgorgement of defendant’s gains in breach of contract 
actions for certain types of contracts, including contracts for the 
sale  of  land,  contractual  protection  of  confidential information, 
 
Such an outcome results in unjust enrichment as between the parties.”). 
10. Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 1977); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. e 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
11. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514, 515–16 (1980); 
Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 678–79; Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co. v. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d 
835, 836 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979). 
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and non-compete agreements.12 Several  courts  have  since 
adopted the language of Restatement (Third) Section 39, allowing 
for disgorgement of a defendant’s gain when there has been an 
“opportunistic” breach of contract.13 In fact, one jurisdiction even 
expanded the remedy allowed in the Restatement (Third).14 
A. Pre-Restatement (Third) Section 39 
Restatement (Third) Section 39 draws from the common law  
in jurisdictions that have allowed for this remedy in several types 
of contract cases, most notably, contracts for the sale of land, 
confidentiality agreements, and non-compete agreements.15 
1. Contracts for the Sale of Land 
Before the existence of the Restatement (Third) Section 39, 
several jurisdictions permitted a plaintiff to recover defendant’s 
gains greater than plaintiff’s losses for deliberate breach of a 
contract for the sale of land.16 In general, courts tended to treat 
contracts for the sale of land differently because real property was 
considered to be unique.17 In a contract for the sale of land, a 
buyer bargains to receive the land in a certain condition. Should 
the defendant deliberately change the condition of that land, by, 
for example, extracting materials such as trees or fill from the  
land after execution of the contract, the buyer does not receive the 
land for which he or she bargained.18 In a straightforward breach 
of contract action, a compensatory damage remedy would afford 
the buyer the difference between the contract price and the fair 
market  value  of  the  land  after  the  damage.19    However,  this 
 
12. See, e.g., Snepp, 444 U.S. at 514, 515–16; Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 
678–79; Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co., 413 N.Y.S.2d at 836. 
13. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056–57 (2015); Enslin v. 
Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 676–77 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
14. See Watson v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1194–95, 1196 (Colo. 
App. 2011). 
15. See, e.g., Snepp, 444  U.S. at 515–16; Laurin, 363  N.E.2d at  678–79; 
Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co., 413 N.Y.S.2d at 836. 
16. See Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 678; May v. Muroff, 483 So. 2d 772, 772 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
17. Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740, 749 (R.I. 1995). 
18. See Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 677; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, illus. 1, 2 (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). 
19. See Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 678. 
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compensatory damage remedy does not restore the land to the 
condition to which the buyer is entitled under the contract. Thus, 
because real property is unique, compensatory damages are often 
inadequate to compensate a buyer for damaged property.20 Where 
the breach of contract for the sale of land is deliberate, courts have 
found that the buyer is entitled to the seller’s gains as a result of 
the breach of the contract because compensatory damages are 
inadequate to protect the buyer’s contractual entitlement to the 
land in its existing condition at the time of contract formation.21 
To demonstrate this principle, the drafters of Restatement 
(Third) Section 39 cited to Laurin v. DeCarolis Construction Co.22 
In that Massachusetts case, the seller of a plot of land deliberately 
removed and sold gravel, trees, and shrubs after executing the 
contract with the buyer.23 The court ordered the defendant to 
disgorge his gains—the $6,480 value of the gravel—to the plaintiff 
because the breach was deliberate and willful, and the plaintiff 
was entitled to the land as it was contracted for, with the trees, 
shrubs, and gravel included.24 The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court in Laurin reasoned that deliberate breaches similar 
to this likely will not result in a major diminution in fair market 
value of the land.25 Therefore, disgorgement of profits is an 
effective remedy because it “deprives the defendant of a profit 
wrongfully made” so that the wrongful party cannot “shield” 
himself from increased liability by claiming that the value of the 
land after damage had only decreased marginally.26 Other courts 
have reiterated this approach in similar situations in contracts for 
the sale of land where the breach is deliberate and defendant has 
profited as a result of the breach.27 
In   Laurin,   the   Massachusetts   Supreme   Judicial   Court 
 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 678–79. 
22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
rep. note on cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 2011); see Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 679. 
23. Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 676. 
24. Id. at 677, 678–79. 
25. Id. at 678. 
26. Id. at 678–79. 
27. See May v. Muroff, 483 So. 2d 772, 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) 
(finding  that  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  disgorgement  of  defendant’s  profit  of 
$240,000 from deliberately removing and selling fill from property rather 
than compensatory damages of $122,067 after executing a contract for the   
sale of the land). 
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emphasized that a remedy of disgorgement of gains by the 
defendant is appropriate only in certain cases.28 Specifically, the 
court focused on the fact that the breach of contract was willful 
and deliberate.29 Second, the court recognized that “damages 
limited to the diminution in value of the premises,” the ordinary 
measure of compensatory damages for breach of contract, “may 
sometimes be seriously inadequate.”30 Lastly, the court explicitly 
stated that a remedy ordering a defendant to disgorge gains in  
this situation is “not punitive” and, instead, affords the plaintiff 
the value or profit to which he or she was entitled under the 
contract.31 
2. Contractual Protection of Confidential Information 
Courts have also recognized a remedy for disgorgement of 
defendant’s gains from breach of contractual protection of 
confidential information.32 In the principle case demonstrating 
this proposition, Snepp v. United States, the United States 
Supreme Court allowed the CIA to recover Snepp’s profits from 
selling a book containing information about his time spent with  
the CIA in South Vietnam.33 Snepp’s employment contract 
contained a provision requiring him to submit any material 
containing information about CIA activities for prepublication 
review by the CIA.34  Snepp deliberately breached this provision  
of the employment contract by publishing his book without 
acquiring the required approval from the CIA, and profited 
through his sales of the books.35 The Court allowed for the 
disgorgement of Snepp’s profits from the books to the CIA,  
because without this remedy, the Government would not be able  
to    protect    its    contractual    entitlement—the    prepublication 
 
 
28. Laurin  v.  DeCarolis  Const.  Co.,  363  N.E.2d  675,  678–79  (Mass. 
1977). 
29. Id. at 678. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 679. 
32. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1980); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, 
illus. 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
33. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507, 515–16. 
34. Id. at 507–08. 
35. Id. at 508. 
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review.36 
Similar to the sale of land, courts consider the contractual 
entitlement to confidential information a right that cannot be 
adequately remedied through ordinary compensatory damages for 
a breach of contract action.37 Indeed, in Snepp, the  Court  
awarded the plaintiff disgorgement of defendant’s profits even 
though the Government conceded that it did not actually sustain 
losses from Snepp’s breach because the book did not reveal any 
classified information.38 If a potential plaintiff in this situation 
could not recover the defendant’s gains, the plaintiff would be 
much more vulnerable in protecting its contractual rights and 
position because the defendant could deliberately breach, knowing 
that the breach is likely to yield little or no provable loss to the 
plaintiff. Without the disgorgement remedy, the plaintiff cannot 
protect his or her contractual rights and the defendant can breach 
the contract with little repercussion. The defendant should not be 
unjustly enriched “at the expense of the plaintiff.”39 
3. Non-Compete Contracts 
Third, courts have recognized a remedy requiring 
disgorgement of defendant’s gains in actions for deliberate breach 
of a non-compete contract.40 In this situation, the plaintiff’s 
contractual entitlement is to prevent its employees from working 
for competitors within a certain amount of time after they leave 
the company to prevent the opening of another business to 
compete with the plaintiff. A compensatory damage remedy is not 
adequate because it is unlikely or difficult to prove that a 
defendant’s breach of a non-compete contract directly resulted in 
loss to the plaintiff.  For example, in Y.J.D. Restaurant Supply Co. 
v. Dib, the defendant deliberately breached an agreement not to 
 
36. Id. at 515–16. 
37. See id. at 514, 516. 
38. Id. at 510. 
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.  2011). 
40. See Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co. v. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1979) (requiring defendant to disgorge $35,500 in net profits from the sale 
of a competing business, thereby deliberately breaching a non-compete 
contract, and where the plaintiff could not prove loss of profits); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. d, 
illus. 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
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compete with the plaintiff within a five-block radius for a period of 
three years.41 The defendant eventually sold his competing 
business, earning a $35,500 profit.42 The plaintiff was unable to 
adequately prove his lost profits from the breach, because there 
were “too many competitive or economic factors involved . . . to 
prove any correct or fair amount of damages.”43 The New York 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the 
defendant’s full profit, $35,500, because, “[e]quity will not aid in 
any scheme or project which might lead to undeserved profit.”44 
Often, a plaintiff may not be able to prove compensable 
damages for loss of profits directly resulting from defendant’s 
breach due to uncertainty of outside economic and competitive 
factors.45 Therefore, a compensatory damage remedy is  
inadequate to protect the plaintiff’s entitlement to restrict a  
person from competing against his business. Courts have allowed 
for disgorgement in restitution to ensure that a  defendant does 
not benefit unjustly from a breach of a non-compete contract that 
is deliberate and profitable.46 
B. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment 
Section 39 
The Restatement (Third) Section 39 allows a plaintiff to 
recover a breaching party’s profits as a result of an “opportunistic” 
breach of contract, provided the breaching party’s profits exceeds 
the plaintiff’s provable loss or the plaintiff cannot prove loss.47 
There are three requirements for the availability of disgorgement 
of defendant gains based on “opportunistic” breach of contract: (1) 
a deliberate breach, (2) where the defendant profited as a result of 
that breach, and (3) the plaintiff’s contractual entitlement cannot 
be protected adequately by compensatory damages.48   For  typical 
 
39. Y.J.D. Rest. Supply Co., 413 N.Y.S.2d at 836. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. See id. 
44. See id. 
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
46. Id. § 39(1) (“If a deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the 
defaulting promisor and the available damage remedy affords inadequate 
protection to the promisee’s contractual entitlement, the promise has a claim 
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breach of contract actions, the measure of a monetary remedy is 
based on plaintiff’s loss, not defendant’s gain.49 Section 39 carves 
out a claim in restitution for a certain type of breach of contract, 
which it calls “opportunistic.”50 A claim that meets all of the 
requirements of this Section is rare.51 Defendant’s gains from the 
breach can be measured either by profits earned or the expenses 
saved as a result of the breach.52 
Contract law recognizes that in some cases, the typical  
remedy of compensatory damages is not sufficient to protect the 
rights for which the plaintiff bargained in the contract. Where 
compensatory damages are insufficient to compensate for that 
right, a court may award specific performance of a contract.53 A 
disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” contract provides the 
same protection for a non-breaching party that is provided by a 
remedy for specific performance, if the plaintiff had brought the 
claim earlier in time.54 In granting specific performance, courts 
already have recognized that there are situations where 
contractual entitlements cannot be protected sufficiently by a 
compensatory remedy. A disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” 
breach of contract suggests that courts recognize the same 
protection, only after the fact.55 
This disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” breach of 
contract intends to protect a party that may be in a vulnerable 
position under the contract by deterring a potential breaching 
party with the threat that the wrongdoer might be required to 
disgorge his gains from the breach.56  The contract rights that this 
 
to restitution of the profit realized by the promisor as a result of  the 
breach.”). 
49. Long v. Atlantic PBS, Inc., 681 A.2d 249, 253 (R.I. 1996). 
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
51. Id. § 39 cmt. a (“The restitution claim described in this section is 
infrequently available, because a breach of contract that satisfies the 
cumulative tests of § 39 is rare.”). 
52. Id. § 39 cmt. e. 
53. Id. § 39 cmt. a (“Where a party’s contractual entitlement would be 
inadequately protected by the legal remedy of damages for breach, a court   
will often reinforce the protection given to the claimant by an order of 
injunction or specific performance.”). 
54. Id. § 39 cmt. d. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. § 39 cmt. b (“Cases in which restitution reaches the profits from a 
breach of contract are those in which the promisee’s contractual position is 
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Section seeks to protect “may resemble non-contractual 
entitlements that are routinely protected” such as 
misappropriation or fiduciary or confidential duty.57 The plaintiff 
in an action for “opportunistic” breach of contract would face an 
inadequate compensatory damage remedy under the contract, or 
may not be able to prove compensable losses at all.58  In a claim  
for restitution under Restatement (Third) Section 39, a plaintiff 
need not prove their own losses.59 This provision aims to deter a 
potential breaching party from deliberately breaching a contract 
and taking advantage of decreased liability in the action because 
the plaintiff either cannot prove compensable losses or the 
compensatory damage remedy would not protect the plaintiff’s 
entitlement under the contract.60 Thus, this provision discourages 
a party from deliberately breaching a contract because the party 
will be required to give its profit to the plaintiff, rather  than 
receive a windfall from breach of contract after paying a 
compensatory damage remedy for the breach.61 
1. Requirements 
The first two requirements under Restatement (Third) Section 
39 are straightforward: the breach must be deliberate and 
profitable.62 This remedy in restitution is only intended to apply  
to conscious wrongdoers who willfully breach a contract, not to 
unintentional breach of contract.63 Further, this provision is also 
only intended to reach those who actually profit from the breach, 
where that profit exceeds the non-breaching party’s provable loss 
or where the non-breaching party cannot prove its loss.64 While it 
may be common for a party to deliberately breach a contract, the 
defendant’s profit resulting from this breach does not often exceed 
 
 
vulnerable to abuse. Vulnerability in this context stems from the difficulty 
that the promisee may fact in recovering, as compensatory damages, a full 
equivalent of the performance for which the promisee has bargained.”). 
57. Id. § 39 cmt. d. 
58. Id. § 39 cmt. c. 
59. Id. § 39 cmt. b. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. § 39(1). 
63. Id. § 39 cmt. f. 
64. Id. § 39(3). 
  
 
 
624 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:614 
 
the plaintiff’s provable losses.65 
In order for a plaintiff to recover disgorgement of defendant’s 
gain for “opportunistic” breach of contract, the “available damage 
remedy” must “afford[] inadequate protection to the promisee’s 
contractual entitlement.”66 Essentially, if the traditional contract 
remedy of compensatory damages will not protect the right 
bargained for under the contract, disgorgement of profits may be 
available, provided the first two conditions are met.67 An example 
of this occurs in contracts for the sale of land.68 There is no 
adequate measure of compensation based on plaintiff’s loss that 
could protect the plaintiff’s contractual right to the land in the 
condition at the time of the contract or as provided for in the 
contract.69 
Often, however, a contractual entitlement can be adequately 
protected by an award of compensatory damages.  For example,  
the non-breaching party of a contract for the sale of goods may 
recover replacement cost to procure the same goods from another 
vendor. In that case, the replacement cost is an  adequate  
measure of compensatory damages to protect the non-breaching 
party’s right under the contract, which is to obtain the goods or  
the reasonable value of what it would cost to obtain the goods from 
another seller. 
Cases lacking an adequate compensatory damage remedy to 
protect a party’s contractual entitlement are often those where an 
injunction or specific performance would have been appropriate 
had the plaintiff brought an action prior to the breach.70  
Comment c of Restatement (Third) Section 39 suggests that one 
possible test to determine if the contractual entitlement cannot be 
adequately protected by a compensatory damage award is to 
conduct a hypothetical test for the availability of either an 
injunction or specific performance.71 For example, in Snepp, if the 
Government was aware that Snepp intended to release his book 
 
65. Id.  § 39 cmt. f. 
66. Id. § 39(1). 
67. See id. 
68. See Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 678  (Mass. 
1977). 
69. See id. 
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.  2011). 
71. Id. 
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without obtaining pre-publication review, a court likely would 
have issued an injunction preventing Snepp from releasing the 
book until he submitted the information for pre-publication 
review.72 Instead, the non-breaching party sued after the 
performance or non-performance had stopped, thus requiring a 
backward-looking remedy instead of the forward-looking remedies 
of specific performance or injunction. Specific performance or 
injunctive relief would have protected the Government’s 
contractual entitlement to pre-publication review when it could  
not adequately be compensated by a compensatory damage award. 
In the same light, a disgorgement remedy addresses situations 
where the plaintiff’s contractual entitlement cannot be protected 
through a compensatory damage award, but after specific 
performance and injunctive relief are no longer an option.73 
2. Illustrations 
Because the requirements for this remedy under Restatement 
(Third) Section 39 make an “opportunistic” breach of contract 
unique, the drafters included several illustrations of applicable 
situations in the law. Many of the illustrations are based on the 
cases referenced in other sections of this Comment. This section 
outlines some of the other applicable cases for disgorgement of 
defendant’s gain that are included in illustrations within 
Restatement (Third) Section 39. 
In certain circumstances, damages may be compensable, but 
still inadequate to protect the plaintiff’s entitlement under the 
contract. Illustration 10 demonstrates an example of when the 
plaintiff is able to demonstrate compensable loss, but his 
compensatory damage award would not protect the rights for 
which he bargained in the contract.74 In this illustration, a car 
dealer and buyer execute a contract for the sale of a used car for 
$5,000, with the stipulation that if the buyer wishes to sell the car 
within two years of the purchase, he would sell the car back to the 
dealer for $4,000, who could then sell it for that price, plus ten 
 
 
 
72. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 (1980). 
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. d (AM. LAW INST.  2011). 
74. Id. § 39 cmt. d., illus. 10. 
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percent commission.75 The buyer deliberately breaches  the 
contract, and sells the car one month later to a third party for 
$10,000.76 The dealer’s losses equal $400, the ten percent 
commission he would have earned from selling the car after 
purchasing it back from the buyer.77 Instead of recovering 
compensatory damages based on his losses, the dealer could bring 
an action seeking restitution for breach of contract, and, under 
Section 39, the dealer would be entitled to recover $6,000, the 
profits wrongfully gained by the buyer through breaching the 
contract by selling the car to a party other than the dealer.78 The 
dealer bargained for the right to buy and resell the car if the buyer 
decided to get rid of it within the first two years of purchase.79 
This right cannot be adequately compensated by the measure of 
the plaintiff’s losses, a $400 commission. 
Other illustrations in the Restatement (Third) address 
situations in which the plaintiff elected to pay in advance for a 
certain performance, and defendant breached by failing to 
perform.80 For example, Illustration 7 outlines a contract that the 
plaintiff City executed with the defendant Fire Department for  
fire protection, specifying that a certain number of firefighters, 
horses, and wagons were to be available for fire protection at all 
times, if needed.81 After the contract expired, the City learned  
that the Fire Department deliberately breached the contract by 
devoting fewer firefighters, wagons, and horses to this 
protection.82 Though the City did not sustain any actual losses 
from the breach, it is entitled to the $100,000 saved by the Fire 
Department as a result of the breach because the City bargained 
for a specific number of resources under the contract, and the Fire 
Department profited by limiting those resources.83 
Finally, another set of illustrations in Restatement (Third) 
Section 39 highlight situations where disgorgement of profit is 
needed   to   adequately   protect   a   plaintiff’s   ability   to enforce 
 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. § 39 cmt. d. 
81. Id.§ 39 cmt. d., illus. 7. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
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negative covenants.84 For example, in Illustration 8, a plaintiff 
landlord contracted to lease property to defendant lessee for one 
year at a cost of $100,000, specifying in the contract that the 
lessee is not allowed to sublet the property.85 Defendant 
deliberately breached the contract, subletting the property to a 
third party for $110,000.86 The landlord is likely not able to prove 
any actual loss as a result of this breach, and his ability to enforce 
a negative covenant in the contract is not protected by 
compensatory damages.87 Therefore, in  this  situation,  the 
landlord is entitled to the defendant’s $10,000 profit under 
Restatement (Third) Section 39.88 
C. Courts Embracing Restatement (Third) Section 39 or 
Expanding Disgorgement Theory 
In the few years after adopting Restatement (Third) Section 
39, a few courts have spoken about it directly and its applicability 
in various jurisdictions. Specifically, the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the disgorgement remedy and Restatement 
(Third) Section 39 with regard to water rights among states.89 
Several other courts have embraced Restatement (Third) Section 
39 and its requirements for the disgorgement of defendant’s gains 
for “opportunistic” breach of contract.90 However, a few 
jurisdictions reject Restatement (Third) Section 39 and the 
availability of disgorgement of defendant gains for certain types of 
breach of contract actions.91 
 
84. Id. § 39 cmt. d., illus. 8. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. See id. 
88. Id. 
89. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056 (2015). 
90. See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 676 (E.D. Pa. 2015) 
(recognizing that while opportunities for a remedy for disgorgement of profits 
in “opportunistic” breaches of contract are narrow, there are certain 
circumstances where a plaintiff may qualify for this relief); Watson v. Cal- 
Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1194–95 (Colo. App. 2011). 
91. See SAS Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Ltd., No. 5:10–CV– 
25–FL, 2015 WL 5227801 at *2 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 2015) (rejecting a request 
for disgorgement of profits for a breach of licensing contract because the 
plaintiff could not produce North Carolina case law that supported this 
remedy); Henry v. Masson, 333 S.W.3d 825, 849 (Tex. App. 2010) 
(“Disgorgement of profits is not a measure of damages available  in  breach  of 
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In Kansas v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court, by a six to three 
decision, allowed Kansas to recover $1.8 million of Nebraska’s 
profit from breach of the Republican River Compact of 1943 and a 
2002 settlement agreement set up to effectuate the Compact.92 A 
Special Master found that Nebraska “knowingly failed to comply” 
with the Republican River Compact by consuming more water 
than the state was allotted, and because the value of water in 
Nebraska exceeded that in Kansas, Nebraska’s gain from the 
breach exceeded Kansas’ loss.93 The Court supported the Special 
Master’s findings and adopted his recommendation of a 
disgorgement remedy because Nebraska profited directly from its 
deliberate breach by consuming 70,869 extra acre-feet of water.94 
Additionally, the Court concluded that awarding compensatory 
damages would be inadequate because, “that remedy alone ‘would 
permit [an upstream State] to ignore its obligation to deliver  
water so long as it is willing’ to pay that amount.”95 Ultimately, 
the United States Supreme Court cited Restatement (Third) 
Section 39 as a basis for Kansas’s entitlement to a disgorgement 
remedy, embracing the availability of this remedy in certain types 
of breach of contract claims.96 
Justice Thomas’s dissent, however, was more skeptical of the 
disgorgement remedy and the influence of Restatement (Third) 
Section 39.97 First, he disagreed with the use of disgorgement in 
this particular case because the disgorgement remedy was meant 
for deliberate and intentional breaches, and disagreed with the 
majority’s position that Nebraska “knowingly” breaching the 
contract equated to intentionally breaching  the  contract.98  He 
also observed that the Supreme Court had never used the 
disgorgement remedy before, and that, “[t]he sheer novelty of this 
proposed remedy counsels against applying it [in the case].”99 
Since 2011, a few other courts have expressly adopted Section 
39 as a basis for a disgorgement remedy in breach of contract 
 
contract action.”). 
92. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1049, 1050, 1051. 
93. Id. at 1051, 1053–54. 
94. Id. at 1057. 
95. Id. (quoting Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 132 (1987)). 
96. See id. at 1057. 
97. Id. at 1068 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 1069. 
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actions. Specifically, the District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District  
of Pennsylvania have concluded that Pennsylvania state law 
supported disgorgement of defendant’s gain as an appropriate 
remedy for “opportunistic” breaches of contract.100 
Furthermore, one jurisdiction even expanded the scope of 
Restatement (Third) Section 39 requirements.101 In Watson v. Cal-
Three, L.L.C., the Colorado Appellate Court concluded that a 
defendant was allowed to recover plaintiff’s profits on a 
counterclaim for breach of contract in a loan transaction for real 
estate.102 The court stated that, “[i]f the breaching party’s 
wrongdoing is intentional or substantial, or there are no other 
means of measuring the wrongdoer’s enrichment, recovery of the 
breaching party’s profits may  be  granted.”103  This  court’s 
standard for awarding disgorgement of profits for “opportunistic” 
breach of contract is even lower than the Restatement (Third) 
provision because it allows for recovery of this remedy when the 
breach is substantial but unintentional.104 
Both prior and subsequent to the Restatement (Third) Section 
39, several states and the United States Supreme Court have 
recognized a plaintiff’s entitlement to a disgorgement remedy for a 
deliberate breach of contracts such as those for the sale of land, 
contractual protection of confidential information, non-compete 
agreements, and breach of water compacts.105 These courts have 
recognized   that   in   certain   contractual   relationships,   a non- 
 
100. See Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 678  (E.D. Pa. 
2015); In re 400 Walnut Associates, L.P., 506 B.R. 645, 668 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2014) (“Pennsylvania law supports an award for restitution as to contract as 
well as tort.”). 
101. See Watson v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1190 (Colo.  App. 
2011). 
102. 254 P.3d at 1194–95. 
103. Id. at 1195 (citing EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, 
Inc., 900 P.2d 113, 119 (Colo. 1995)) (emphasis added). 
104. See id. An example of a substantial breach can be found  in 
EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., where the Colorado 
Supreme Court determined that the defendant “substantially” breached the 
contract when it unilaterally decided to stop royalty payments to the plaintiff 
pending clarification of obligations under the contract. 900 P.2d at 116, 119. 
105. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1056 (2015); Snepp v. U.S., 
444 U.S. 507, 515 (1980); Y.J.D. Restaurant Supply Co. v. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d 
835, 835–36 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., 363 N.E. 2d 
675, 679 (Mass. 2015). 
  
 
 
630 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:614 
 
breaching party is vulnerable and is not able to protect its 
bargained for entitlement under the contract because damages 
from a breach would likely result in little or no provable 
compensatory damages. Therefore, the disgorgement remedy 
serves as an effective alternative for a plaintiff, because, as the 
United States Supreme Court noted in Snepp, without the 
disgorgement remedy, the non-breaching party is deprived of 
means to protect the very thing it sought to protect under the 
contract.106 
II. DISGORGEMENT OF DEFENDANT’S GAIN IN RHODE ISLAND LAW 
Rhode Island has little case law discussing disgorgement of 
defendant’s gains as a potential remedy both in contract and other 
contexts. When Rhode Island has allowed a plaintiff to recover a 
defendant’s gains, courts have structured it as the remedy of an 
“accounting for profits,” rather than “disgorgement of profit or 
gain.”107 An accounting for profits is a remedy that “compel[s] a 
defendant to account for and pay over money owed to the plaintiff 
but held by the defendant.”108 Therefore, though the method 
includes one extra step, taking an account of the profits, the end 
result is essentially the same, because the defendant must turn its 
profits over to the plaintiff. 
A. Contract Context 
Rhode Island case law varies in its recognition of a 
disgorgement remedy for certain types of breach of contract 
claims.109  In cases where the contract at issue is a contract for  
the sale of land, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has recognized 
the possibility of disgorgement of defendant’s gains from a 
deliberate breach of contract.110 Additionally, Rhode Island has 
allowed a plaintiff to recover disgorgement of profits earned  
during delay in actions for specific performance of a contract for 
the sale of land where the defendant has breached the contract  by 
 
106. See 444 U.S. at 514–16. 
107. See, e.g., George v. George F. Berkander, Inc., 169 A.2d 370, 371 (R.I. 
1961). 
108. 1A C.J.S. Accounting § 6 (2016). 
109. See George, 169 A.2d at 371; Sweeney v. Brow, 86 A. 115, 118–19 
(R.I. 1913); Bright v. James, 87 A. 316, 317 (R.I. 1913). 
110. See Bright, 87 A. at 317. 
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delaying conveyance.111 In another case dealing with a non- 
compete contract, the Rhode Island Supreme Court denied the 
plaintiff’s request for disgorgement of gains for breach of the 
contract.112 However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
recognized that there are situations where compensatory damages 
are inadequate to remedy the plaintiff, and instead issued 
injunctive relief or specific performance of the contract.113 
Although there is little Rhode Island case law regarding 
disgorgement of defendant’s gains in a breach of contract action, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has at least discussed the 
possibility of the disgorgement remedy in the context of contracts 
for the sale of land.114 In Bright v. James, Bright brought an 
action for specific performance of the contract for the sale of land, 
and additionally, an accounting of the defendant’s profits from 
selling timber that had been cut from the land after the execution 
of the contract.115 The trial court awarded Bright an accounting  
for those profits.116 On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
reversed the award; instead, awarding the fair market value of the 
timber, rather than the specific profits of the defendant. Because 
it concluded that the defendant believed the contract was 
abandoned, the fair market value for the sale of the timber would 
be a fair measure of damages, similar to a situation where the 
plaintiff had brought an action in conversion.117 By requiring the 
defendant to pay the value of the timber for sale, the court still 
required the defendant to give up his gains from the breach of 
 
111. Sweeny, 86 A. at 119 (awarding a non-breaching party an accounting 
for profit of the rents collected between execution of the contract and 
resolution of the case as a result of the deliberate breach of the defendant 
seller). 
112. George, 169 A.2d at 373. 
113. Griffin v. Zapata, 570 A.2d 659, 661–62 (R.I. 1990) (granting specific 
performance in an action for breach of contract for the sale of property 
because, “[t]he granting of specific performance is appropriate when adequate 
compensation cannot be achieved through money damages as where the item 
is unique and distinctive, such as land”). 
114. Bright, 87 A. at 316–17. 
115. Bright v. James, 85 A. 545, 545, 546 (R.I. 1913). 
116. Bright, 87 A. at 317. 
117. Id. This case is analogous to Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., infra 
Part I.A.1, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court awarded the 
plaintiff the value of timber defendant sold in breach of a contract for the sale 
of land. 363 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Mass. 1977). The drafters  of  Restatement 
(Third) § 39 cite to Laurin as authority for the Restatement (Third) provision. 
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contract, though it may not have been the exact dollar amount of 
his profit, and did not require any proof of losses from the 
plaintiff.118 Additionally, it seems that the court would have 
allowed the plaintiff to recover the full value of the defendant’s 
profit had it not found that the defendant thought the contract  
had lapsed.119 
Similarly, in Sweeny v. Brow, the plaintiffs sued the 
defendant seller for breach of a contract for the sale of land, and 
asked for the remedy of an accounting of the defendant’s profits 
from cutting growing crops on the land after the execution of the 
contract.120 The court found that the contract for the sale of land 
was valid, and, therefore, that the plaintiff was entitled to an 
accounting of the crops cut and removed from the land from the 
date of execution of the contract.121 
The only other Rhode Island case law that discusses a 
disgorgement remedy is George v. George F. Berkander, Inc., a 
1961 Rhode Island Supreme Court case.122 In George, the plaintiff 
and defendant entered into a contract in which the plaintiff 
authorized the defendant to use its process for encasing small 
objects in plastic-like material, called Lucite, and to sell those 
objects in states other than Rhode Island.123 The defendant 
deliberately breached the contract by selling the items in Rhode 
Island, and the plaintiff brought an action for breach of 
contract,124 seeking an injunction barring the defendant from 
selling in Rhode Island, and further, an accounting of the 
defendant’s gains as a result of selling the items in the state.125 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the plaintiff would be 
entitled  to  a  remedy  for  breach  of contract to  the extent that it 
 
118. See generally Bright, 87 A. at 317. 
119. See id. 
120. 86 A. 115, 115–16 (R.I. 1913). 
121. Id. at 118–19. 
122. 169 A.2d 370, 370 (R.I. 1961). 
123. Id. at 370–71. 
124. The plaintiffs brought an action for breach of contract, seeking a 
restitutionary remedy for disgorgement of defendant’s profits, but, based on 
the argument for disgorgement, the court assumed that the plaintiff wanted 
the court to analyze the case as both a breach of contract action and a claim 
for unfair competition. George, 169 A.2d at 370–71. The court found that the 
plaintiff did not meet the elements of a claim for unfair competition. Id. at 
371. 
125. Id. 
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could prove its losses, but that it was not entitled to disgorgement 
of the defendant’s profits from the breach.126 The court reasoned 
that, “[t]here was nothing in the record here that would warrant 
the establishment of a more extensive measure of damages.”127 
Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiff could not prove 
loss of profits and thus was not entitled to a monetary remedy for 
the defendant’s sale of goods in Rhode Island in breach of the 
contract.128 
On its face, the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s ruling in 
George may appear to pose a problem to plaintiffs seeking 
disgorgement of defendant’s gains in a breach of a non-compete 
contract in particular.129 However, the court’s reasoning can be 
distinguished from the principles espoused in Restatement (Third) 
Section 39. Implicit in the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s opinion 
in George is its conclusion that a remedy based on defendant’s 
profits would be punitive.130 Because the court characterized the 
disgorgement award as a punitive damage award, it is 
understandable why the court dismissed the award’s applicability 
to a breach of contract case because normally, punitive damages 
are not permitted in breach of contract actions.131 However, 
Restatement (Third) Section 39 does not propose a punitive  
remedy for breach of contract. Rather, it proposes restitution as  
an alternative to a compensatory damage remedy in 
“opportunistic” breach of contract actions.132 In fact, the theory 
behind  the  disgorgement  award  is  to  provide  the plaintiff with 
 
 
126. Id. at 373. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. The superior court separately found that the defendants failed to 
pay royalty payments for one item under the contract, and held that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to a monetary award for the total of the royalty 
payments, $158.91.  Id. at 371. 
129. See id. at 371–72. 
130. Id. at 371 (emphasis added). The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
suggested that a remedy based upon defendant’s profits rather  than 
plaintiff’s losses in an unfair competition claim may be awarded, but refers to 
this remedy as “punitive.” Specifically, the court stated, “[a plaintiff may] in 
appropriate circumstances, be awarded punitive damages by requiring 
respondent to account . . . for such profits as arose out of the deception.” Id. 
131. O’Coin v. Woonsocket Inst. Trust Co., 535 A.2d 1263, 1266  (R.I. 
1988). 
132. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
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value to which it was entitled under the contract by denying the 
defendant the ability to keep its wrongful gains.133 
Also, George did not entirely close the door on the possibility  
of a remedy outside of that which is typical for contract actions. 
The court contended that there may be “special circumstance[s]” 
that “warrant the establishment of a more extensive measure of 
damages.”134 By saying this, the court implicitly suggested that 
the normal compensatory damage remedy may not be adequate in 
all breach of contract actions. Through this suggestion, the court  
is preparing to recognize a remedy in the future such as is 
described here. 
In sum, Rhode Island case law does not have a clear direction 
for recognition of a plaintiff’s right to recover defendant’s gains for 
breach of contract claims. The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s 
ruling on the disgorgement remedy in George does not represent 
the consensus for Rhode Island law on the disgorgement of 
defendant’s gains in all breach of contract actions. In Bright v. 
James and Sweeny v. Brow, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
explicitly allowed for the possibility of disgorgement of defendant’s 
gains from cutting timber or crops in breach of contracts for the 
sale of land.135 Rhode Island’s recognition of a disgorgement 
remedy in contracts for the sale of land and contexts outside of 
breach of contract lend the conclusion that it would not be far 
reaching for courts to allow a disgorgement remedy in 
“opportunistic” breaches of contract. Rhode Island has already 
acknowledged the availability of disgorgement in several contexts, 
and therefore, should extend this allowance to include all 
“opportunistic” breaches of contract. 
B. Other Contexts 
Rhode Island case law recognizes a disgorgement remedy for 
plaintiffs in actions other than those involving contracts. In 
addition, Rhode Island specifically allows the plaintiff to recover 
defendant’s gains in claims for unfair competition and breach of 
fiduciary duty.136 
 
133. Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 2015). 
134. George, 169 A.2d at 372–73. 
135. Bright v. James, 85 A. 545, 546 (R.I. 1913); Sweeny v. Brow, 86 A. 
115, 119 (R.I. 1913). 
136. See Bostitch v. King Fastener Co., 140 A.2d 274, 283 (R.I. 1958). 
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1. Unfair Competition 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has expressly allowed a 
plaintiff to recover defendant’s gains in cases of unfair competition 
where the plaintiff can prove fraud.137 The leading case is 
Bostitch, Inc. v. King Fastener Co., where the court found the 
defendant was liable in a claim for unfair competition when it 
purposely copied the plaintiff’s packaging for staples.138 The 
plaintiff, a leading manufacturer of staplers and other associated 
products, used a well-known green and yellow packaging design 
for its boxes of staples.139 The defendant sold its staples in a box 
almost identical to the plaintiff’s, particularly with the green and 
yellow color scheme.140 Approximately twenty percent of the 
defendant’s profits were earned through selling staples to fit 
plaintiff’s staplers in those yellow and green boxes.141 The  
superior court required the defendant to disgorge its profits from 
staple sales to the plaintiffs.142 The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
ultimately reversed the superior court because in this case, the 
plaintiff could not prove fraud, but the court expressly stated that 
a plaintiff could recover defendant’s ill-gotten gains from unfair 
competition.143 In this case, it would have been difficult for the 
plaintiff to prove its losses as a result of the defendant’s 
wrongdoing.144 Had the court found fraud and allowed the 
disgorgement remedy, it would have been the only method to 
deprive the defendant of its wrongfully acquired gains.145 
2. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Rhode Island has also recognized a disgorgement remedy for 
claims of breach of fiduciary duty.146  In fact, in Grant v. Nyman, 
 
137. Id. at 284. 
138. 140 A.2d 274, 278 (R.I. 1958). 
139. Id. at 277. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 279. 
143. Id. at 283–84 (“It is well established in cases involving unfair 
competition that remedies available to an injured party include . . . the 
ordering of an accounting to the injured party by the offending party for all 
profits arising out of the imitation . . . .”). 
144. See id. at 278. 
145. Id. at 284. 
146. See Lawton v. Nyman, 357 F. Supp. 2d 428 (D.R.I. 2005). 
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the plaintiff requested disgorgement of the defendant’s gains from 
a breach of fiduciary duty.147 The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
stated in response that the “traditional equity remedy for breach  
of fiduciary duty is the monetary remedy of an ‘accounting.’”148 
A specific example of this is found in Lawton v. Nyman.149 In 
that case, the United States District Court for the District  of 
Rhode Island, interpreting a state law claim, discussed the 
availability of the disgorgement remedy under Rhode Island law 
for breach of fiduciary duty.150 The court ultimately awarded 
compensatory damages because the damage award equaled the 
amount of the defendant’s profit as a result of the breach of 
fiduciary duty.151 However, the court expressly stated that a 
remedy requiring the defendant to disgorge his gains for breach of 
fiduciary duty would also be appropriate in this case.152 In 
response to the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff did not 
produce evidence to establish a constructive trust—a different 
equitable remedy—the court held that as an alternative to a 
constructive trust, “disgorgement or a money judgment may be 
appropriate remedies for unjust enrichment, especially when the 
plaintiff is not seeking to recover particular property or a specific 
fund of money.”153 
III. RHODE ISLAND SHOULD ALLOW FOR DISGORGEMENT OF DEFENDANT 
GAINS IN “OPPORTUNISTIC” BREACH OF CONTRACT CASES 
Case law demonstrates that many courts allow for plaintiffs  
to recover the defendant’s gains from breach of “opportunistic” 
contract in several situations, including: contracts for the sale of 
land; contractual entitlements to protection of confidential 
information; and breach of non-compete contracts.154 In Rhode 
Island,  the  Rhode  Island  Supreme  Court  has  recognized  the 
 
147. No.  PC03-2893,  2004  WL  1769150,  at  *1  (R.I.  Super.  Ct.  July 9, 
2004). 
148. Id. at *2 (quoting In re Evangelista, 760 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1985)). 
149. 357 F.Supp.2d 428, 430–31 (D.R.I. 2005). 
150. Id. at 434. 
151. Id. at 440. 
152. Id. at 434. 
153. Id. 
154. Snepp v. U.S., 444 U.S. 507, 516 (1980); Y.J.D. Restaurant Supply  
Co. v. Dib, 413 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836 (N.Y. 1979); Laurin v. DeCarolis Const. Co., 
363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 2015). 
  
 
2017] DISGORGEMENT REMEDY 637 
 
possibility of a remedy based on defendant’s gains in contracts for 
the sale of land, along with contexts outside of contract claims, 
including unfair competition and breach of fiduciary duty.155 
Based on the logic of these cases, Rhode Island should extend 
recognition of a disgorgement remedy for all “opportunistic” 
contract claims. 
Ultimately, a remedy in restitution for disgorgement of 
defendant’s gains makes sense when the defendant commits an 
“opportunistic” breach of contract. When entering into a contract, 
parties bargain for certain rights that they expect will be fulfilled 
by performance of the contract. Typically, a party then has the 
choice to perform the contract or to breach and then pay 
compensation for plaintiff’s losses resulting from the breach.156 
However, in cases where there has been an “opportunistic” breach, 
payment of compensatory damages is insufficient to protect the 
rights that the non-breaching party bargained for under the 
contract, and the disgorgement remedy is needed.157 
A disgorgement remedy for an “opportunistic” breach of 
contract encourages voluntary transactions and reinforces the 
stability of contracts because it protects the parties’ contractual 
positions.158 The disgorgement remedy also reinforces a recurring 
theme in the law of unjust enrichment that a conscious wrongdoer 
should not be able to keep its gains.159 If the defendant’s “liability 
is limited to provable damages[,]” then the “defendant’s election to 
disregard the plaintiff’s entitlement is inadequately deterred.”160 
Further, the disgorgement remedy in the Restatement (Third) 
Section 39 protects the “integrity of the parties’ bargain and of the 
bargaining process by which contracts are made,” because it 
encourages both parties to respect the entitlements under the 
contract.161  Those situations that meet the requirements under 
 
155. George v. George F. Berkander, Inc., 169 A.2d 370, 371 (R.I. 1961); 
Sweeney v. Brow, 86 A. 115, 118–19 (R.I. 1913); Bright v. James, 87 A. 316, 
317 (R.I. 1913). 
156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.  2011). 
157. Id. 
158. Id. § 39 cmt. b. 
159. Id. § 39 cmt. a. 
160. Andrew Kull, Disgorgement for Breach, the  “Restitution  Interest,” 
and the Restatement of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2021, 2045 (2001). 
161. Id. 
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the Restatement (Third) Section 39 include contractual 
entitlements that cannot be easily valued monetarily.162 Instead  
of allowing the defendant to take advantage of a vulnerable party 
by deliberately breaching a contract and profiting from that 
breach, a disgorgement remedy encourages adherence to the 
contract.163 For example, an employee that has signed a non- 
compete agreement will be deterred from breaching that 
agreement if the employee knows that the employee will have to 
disgorge all of his or her gains from the breach. The availability of 
the disgorgement remedy encourages both parties to perform 
under the contract, particularly where one party’s entitlements 
under the contract are vulnerable. 
Also, a disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” breach of 
contract does not undermine the norm of compensatory damages  
in breach of contract claims because the disgorgement remedy is 
narrowly tailored to specific circumstances that likely will be 
infrequent.164 More often than not, a non-breaching party will be 
adequately protected by a compensatory damage remedy from 
provable damages.165 
The disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” breach of 
contract is rooted in two major policy considerations. First, a 
disgorgement remedy for breach of contract protects those rights 
bargained for under a contract that cannot be  adequately 
protected by an award of compensatory damages.166 Second, 
disgorgement reiterates the theory in restitution that a conscious 
wrongdoer should not be allowed to keep its ill-gotten gains.167 
Because Rhode Island courts have granted specific performance or 
injunctive relief in breach of contract actions,168 thereby 
recognizing that some contractual rights cannot be adequately 
protected through compensatory damages, and because Rhode 
Island courts have already granted the disgorgement remedy in 
some cases, courts in Rhode Island should follow other jurisdiction 
in allowing the disgorgement remedy for “opportunistic” breaches 
 
162. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.  2011). 
163. Id. § 39 cmt. a. 
164. Id.  § 39 cmt. c. 
165. See id. § 39 cmt. a. 
166. See id. § 39 cmt. a. 
167. See id. § 39 cmt. b. 
168. Griffin v. Zapata, 570 A.2d 659, 661–62 (R.I. 1990). 
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of contract. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The law encourages and supports voluntary transactions 
through the formation of contracts. Sometimes, parties bargain  
for rights under a contract that cannot be adequately protected 
with an award of compensatory damages. In the rare situation 
where the defendant has deliberately breached the contract, 
profited from the breach, and a compensatory damage remedy 
would be inadequate to protect the right that was bargained for 
under the contract, the Restatement (Third) Section 39 provides  
an alternative remedy in a claim for restitution of disgorgement of 
defendant’s gains for the non-breaching party.169 
The trend of case law has demonstrated a tendency to 
recognize the availability of disgorgement of a defendant’s profits 
that have exceeded the plaintiff’s provable losses or where the 
plaintiff cannot prove losses at all. Several jurisdictions have 
either expressly allowed for this type of remedy in breach of 
contract actions, like Massachusetts in Laurin, or have adopted 
Restatement (Third) Section 39 word for word, like the United 
States Supreme Court in Kansas. While Rhode Island law varies 
with respect to its stance on a disgorgement remedy in breach of 
contract actions, in the past, it has awarded plaintiffs 
disgorgement of defendant’s gains based on contracts for the sale 
of land as well as other contexts.170 Therefore, Rhode  Island 
should recognize a plaintiff’s right to a remedy of disgorgement of 
defendant’s gains in “opportunistic” breach of contract actions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 
(AM. LAW INST. 2011). 
170. See George v. George F. Berkender, 169 A.2d 370, 371 (R.I. 1961); 
Bright v. James, 87 A. 316, 317 (R.I. 1913). 
